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THE TRUE STORY OF DRM
by
MATĚJ MYŠKA
Digital rights management systems (commonly abbreviated and further referred as  
“DRM”) were introduced in 1994 as a technological tool for control of accessing  
and handling the digital content. Since then, DRM have been a very controversial  
topic and the story of implementing DRM has been full of turns and twists. In the  
beginning DRM were seen as a panacea to the problem of illegal sharing of copy-
righted works. However, the unsatisfied users rapidly cracked the DRM protection  
and consequently another layer of protection, namely from law banning such beha-
vior was needed.
The aim of this paper is to present the corresponding response of lawmakers on  
the international and European level. It should also provide a comprehensive over-
view of the milestones in the development of DRM.
Based on this legal and chronological summary, the crucial question, whether  
the DRM have failed and proven themselves as “defective by design” from the con-
sumer’s point of view should be answered. Lastly the future development in the  
area of DRM should be briefly sketched out.
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1. WHY DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT?
1.1. TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTION OF COPYRIGHT
Digitalization and the ability to disseminate copyrighted works rapidly via 
the Internet without any significant quality loss brought a drastic shift in the 
established business models in the relevant areas of market that is the copy-
right industries.1 Because of the fact, that the Internet could be turned into 
an inexpensive and widespread distribution medium, the content interme-
1 For the impact of digitalization on intellectual property in general see especially: Lessig, L. 
2004, Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity, Penguin Press, p. 125 et seq.
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diaries (i.e.  the publishers,  distributors and recording companies)  are be-
coming  unnecessary.2 However,  they  employ various  strategies  to  retain 
their controlling position and protect their vested interest. Yu3 refers to this 
state as the “Copyright Wars” and enumerates these particular strategies – 
lobbying,4 litigation,5 licensing,6 education7 and self-help. 
This article focuses on the last practice. Self-help of the copyright indus-
tries  could  be  described  as  a  “the-answer-to-the-machine-is-in-the-
machine”8 approach and means the effort to restrain users from unauthor-
ized  usage of  copyrighted  digital  content  with  the  help of  technological 
measures, i.e. digital rights management systems (DRM). 
DRM  are  implemented  mostly  in  the  entertainment  industry.  Con-
sequently, this article should discuss mainly issues in relation to these par-
ticular areas of digital music and movies, deliberately omitting the issues of 
broadcasting and software related DRM.
1.2. DRM DEFINITION
The DRM are employed of DRM on a wide range of digital or digitalization-
able contents (e.g. VHS, DVDs, CDs, HD-DVDs, eBooks, music subscription 
services, online download services etc.) and pursue different objectives in 
every single application.
Therefore it is difficult to provide a clear and comprehensive definition 
of the term DRM that would cover all of its aspects. Also the DRM are a 
subject to constant and rapid development and due to this fact every defini-
tion of DRM gets outdated very quickly.
2 Lucchi calls this process simply disintermediation. In: Lucchi, N. 2005, 'Intellectual Property 
Rights in Digital Media: A Comparative Analysis of Legal Protection, Technological Meas-
ures and New Business Models under E.U. and U.S. Law', http://ssrn.com/abstract=704101 
[Accessed 13 January 2009].
3 Yu, K. P. 2006, 'The Escalating Copyright Wars', http://ssrn.com/abstract=436693,[Accessed 
13 January 2009]. 
4 See infra in [2].
5 Recording industry represented by the relevant industry trade groups – mainly the Record 
Industry Association of America and Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) en-
gaged in massive campaign of suing individuals on allegations of copyright infringement. 
See: Kravets, D. 2008, 'File Sharing Lawsuits at a Crossroads, After 5 Years of RIAA Litiga-
tion'  http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/09/proving-file-sh.html  [Accessed  13  January 
2009].; Lately, RIAA declared to end this campaign, for details see: Kravets, D. 2008, 'Ana-
lysis:  RIAA  Strategy  Shift  Mired  in  Murky  Legal  Waters'  http://blog.wired.com/
27bstroke6/2008/12/analysis-riaa-s.html [Accessed 13 January 2009].
6 Providing users with legal alternatives to illegal downloading like music subscription ser-
vices, however this also did not turn out to be trouble-free, see infra [3.5].
7 The effort to raise the awareness of the users about the fact, that downloading of pirated di-
gital content is illegal. Example being the “You Wouldn't Steal a Car” campaign of MPAA 
from 2004 - this clip (available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jg_yehioJX8)  is put be-
fore the content on DVDs.
8 As defined by Clark in: Clark, C. The answer to the machine is in the machine. p. 139-48. In: 
Hugenholtz,  P.  B.  (ed.)  The Future  of  Copyright  in  a  Digital  Environment,  The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1996, s. 139 et seq.
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However, for the purpose of this article DRM may be understood as an 
overwhelming term for implementation of technology (both online and off-
line) that allows the copyright holder to control the access and copying pos-
sibilities of the protected work, the identification, trading and management 
of related payment of such work.
1.3. DRM, TPM, RMI
Not only the definition of DRM is heterogeneous, also the terminology used 
in connection with DRM does not provide for clarity. Commonly are used 
terms like technological protection measures, copy-protection measures, ac-
cess control systems or copy protection, copyright protection systems etc.
However, we can distinguish basically two elements of every DRM:
Technological protection measures (further referred as “TPM”) defined 
in  the Art.  6(3)  of  the INFOSOC Directive9 as  any technology,  device  or 
component that, in the normal course of its operation, is designed to pre-
vent or restrict acts, in respect of works or other subject-matter, which are 
not authorized by the right holder of any copyright or any right related to 
copyright as provided for by law.
Rights management information (further referred as “RMI”) legally defi-
ned as information which identifies the work, the author of the work, the 
owner of any right in the work, or information about the terms and conditi-
ons of use of the work, and any numbers or codes that represent such infor-
mation, when any of these items of information is attached to a copy of a work 
or appears in connection with the communication of a work to the public.10
Technological protection measures and Rights management information 
jointed together fulfill the general definition of DRM, therefore DRM enjoy 
also the full protection of law.
2. LAW: ANOTHER LAYER OF PROTECTION
Almost  every  new  DRM  implementation  has  been  compromised  and 
hacked11 and thus another layer of protection, apart from the technological, 
was needed. Consequently, the entertainment industry lobbied12 to put the 
force of law behind the DRM and thus prohibit circumvention of TPM, re-
moval of RMI and trading in circumvention tools. In the forthcoming text 
we should provide a simple overview of the related relevant legal measures 
taken in the field of DRM.
9 See infra in [2.2].
10 Art. 12 WCT.
11 See infra in [4].
12 See for example: Hugehnholtz, B. 2000, 'Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and 
Possibly Invalid', http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/opinion-EIPR.html [Accessed 
13 January 2009].
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2.1. THE WIPO INTERNET TREATIES
On the international level the basic lex lata documents are the two “Internet 
treaties”,  namely the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright 
Treaty13 (further referred as “WCT”) and the World Intellectual  Property 
Organization Performances  and Phonograms Treaty14 (further  referred as 
“WPPT”),  which  were  adopted  at  Diplomatic  Conference  in  Geneva  in 
December 1996. 
In relation to their scope of application they stipulate the obligations for 
the contracting parties to “provide adequate legal protection and effective 
legal remedies  against  the circumvention of effective technological  meas-
ures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights 
under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect 
of their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or per-
mitted by law.”15 
The contracting parties should furthermore provide an adequate protec-
tion from removal of the RMI.
2.2. EUROPEAN UNION – INFOSOC DIRECTIVE
On behalf  of  the  European Community16 the  WCT and WPPT were  ap-
proved by Council Decision of 16th March 2000 and implemented by the 
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22nd 
May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights  in  the  information  society17 (further  referred  as  “INFOSOC 
Directive”).18
The Directive prohibits in Art. 6 circumvention of effective19 TPM, trad-
ing in circumvention tools and in Art. 7 removing of RMI. The lobbying had 
13 With 68 total contracting parties – http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=
en&treaty_id=16,  Full  text  of  the  treaty:  http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/
treaties/en/ip/wct/pdf/trtdocs_wo033.pdf
14 With  68  total  contracting  parties.  Full  text  of  the  treaty:  http://www.wipo.int/export/ 
sites/www/treaties/en/ip/wppt/pdf/trtdocs_wo034.pdf
15 (Art. 10 WCT, respectively Art. 18 WPPT)
16 Decision  of  the  European  Council  2000/278/EC,  available  at:  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000D0278:EN:NOT
17 Text  of  the  Directive  available  at:  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=CELEX:32001L0029:EN:HTML
18 Nevertheless, the TPMs were mentioned on the European level before the INFOSOC Direct-
ive in the two following directives:
1. Directive 91/250/EC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs. 1991
2. Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 1998 
on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access
Both of them prohibiting trading in circumvention tools in Art 7 (c), respectively 4.
19 In order to be deemed effective the DRM has to achieve the protection objective. Interest-
ingly Helsinki District Court held in Case R 07/1004 25 May 2007 that the below discussed 
DRM system CSS on DVDs is  ineffective,  because the  circumvention tools  were  widely 
available online.
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its  heaviest  impact  on the Art 6(4)  which stipulates  the obligation of the 
Member states to take appropriate measures to ensure that the users may 
benefit from copyright exceptions. As Wiebe remarks,20 “the most important 
exception, the right for private use is only optional”, which means that “no 
private use can be enforced if the national legislators does not provide for it.”
Important is also the recital 48 of the Directive, which enacts the prin-
ciple of proportionality,  that is  the trading in devices that have commer-
cially significant use other than to circumvent technical protection should 
not be prohibited. Furthermore, the recital 57 stipulates, that DRM should 
incorporate privacy safeguards in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protec-
tion of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and the 
free movement of such data. However, as Bygrave21 remarks, these could be 
hardly seen as any binding obligation for the member states. Firstly because 
of the legal nature of recitals of directives and secondly of the used condi-
tional “should” instead of imperative form “shall”.
3. DRM CONTROVERSIES AND MILESTONES
The DRM are  heavily  criticized  by the  Consumer  Interests  groups,22 the 
main problem being that the rules of behavior the DRM are enforcing are 
not covered by positive law. Furthermore, the practices could be also re-
garded as an anticompetitive behavior. 
The coalition of all consumers’ organizations in Europe has launched a 
Campaign on Consumers’ Digital Rights in November 2005, issuing a leg-
ally non-binding “Declaration of Consumers’  Digital  Rights”.23 However, 
the importance of this document could be seen in pinpointing out the most 
important areas in which the consumers’ rights are usually tampered the 
most. The Declaration stipulates these following rights of consumers in the 
digital environment:
̶ Right to choice, knowledge and cultural diversity.
In: Report to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee 
on the application of Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of copy-
right  and  related  rights  in  the  information  society,  available  at:  http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/copyright/docs/copyright-infso/application-report_en.pdf.
20 Polčák et al., 2007, Introduction to ICT law (Selected issues), Masarykova univerzita, Brno, 
p. 172.
21 Bygrave, L. A., 2002, The Technologisation of Copyright: Implications for Privacy and Re-
lated Interests, European Intellectual Property Review, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 51-57.
22 Most active being:  in the USA – Electronic Frontier Foundation (http://www.eff.org/); in 
Europe – European Digital Rights initiative (http://www.edri.org/) or the 
23 See: Consumers Digital Rights,  http://www.beuc.eu/Content/Default.asp?PageID=825 [Ac-
cessed 13 January 2009].
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̶ Right to the principle of “technical  neutrality” – defend and maintain 
consumer rights in the digital environment.
̶ Right to benefit from technological innovations without abusive restric-
tions.
̶ Right to interoperability of content and devices.
̶ Right to the protection of privacy.
̶ Right not to be criminalized.
In the following analysis we should demonstrate how the users’ rights 
were actually violated. It must be noted that the number of quoted cases is 
not final. The selection of cases represents only the basic milestones in the 
development of DRM, in which the fundamental problems connected with 
usage of DRM were addressed.
3.1. CASE DECSS
One of the first important cases in the development of DRM and struggle 
for consumers’ rights was the case of Jon Lech Johansen. This young Nor-
wegian  programmer  hacked  the  DRM  system  on  DVDs  called  Content 
Scramble System (CSS), which restricted him from playing his own DVD on 
a Linux PC and thus violating his right to benefit from technological innov-
ations without abusive restrictions. In 1999 he was charged by the Norwegi-
an Economic  Crime Unit  for  offences  against  Norwegian  Criminal  Code 
Art. 145 (2). His defense, assisted by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, ar-
gued that it was legal under Norwegian law to make copies of DVDs for 
personal use.  Consequently, the court ruled24 there was no evidence that 
either Johansen or others had used the decryption code (DeCSS) illegally 
and acquitted him of all charges.
3.2. SONY ROOTKIT SCANDAL
In order to protect the copyrighted CD from being pirated, Sony BMG em-
ployed in 2005 the MediaMax and Sony XCP DRM on estimated 15 million 
music CDs. This software was installed secretly25 on computers without the 
user’s consent while trying to play the CDs. The software had malicious ef-
fect on the Microsoft Windows operating system and opened security holes 
that allowed viruses to break in. It also caused the computer to slow down. 
Also the DRM systems were “calling home”, i. e. reporting the users’ beha-
24 English  translation  of  the  decision  is  available  at:  http://w2.eff.org/IP/Video/
Johansen_DeCSS_case/20030109_johansen_decision.html. [Accessed 13 January 2009].
25 The rootkit was discovered by Mark Russinovich on 31st October 2005, see Russinovich, M. 
2005, Sony, Rootkits and Digital Rights Management Gone Too Far http://blogs.technet.com
/markrussinovich/archive/2005/10/31/sony-rootkits-and-digital-rights-management-gone-
too-far.aspx [Accessed 13 January 2009].
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vior habits  of music consumption to Sony BMG.26 This conduct could be 
qualified as a grave violation of the right to the protection of privacy and the 
right benefit from technological innovations without abusive restrictions.
Consequently27 three separate class action lawsuits were filed, the users 
won  and  under  the  terms  of  the  settlement,28 people  who  purchased
XCP-protected CDs were offered either to apply for cash payment of $7.50 
plus a free album download, or to download three albums for free.
3.3. CASE iTUNES
Norway’s Consumer Ombudsman Bjoern Erik  Thon ruled in  June 200629 
that Apple's DRM FairPlay and its refusal to support competing music ser-
vices on the popular iPod are illegal in the country and that the terms of the 
EULA are confusing for the customer. The ombudsman gave Apple three 
options what to do – either to license out FairPlay, or to develop an open 
standard or  to  abandon DRM completely.  When after  almost  two  years 
Apple did not meet the requirements of the Ombudsman, he decided to 
submit this case over to the Higher Norwegian Market Council. The whole 
case might have ended up in a court trial between Norway and Apple,30 
with the possibility of being a very important decision concerning the right 
to  interoperability  of  content  and  devices.  However,  Apple  averted  the 
threat of prosecution on 6th January 2009 by finally fulfilling the demands 
of the Ombudsman. Starting from the above mentioned date the music pur-
chased over iTunes could be obtained also in unprotected MP3 data format, 
which rendered the complaint irrelevant.
3.4. STEVE JOBS THOUGHTS ON MUSIC
AND THE YEAR OF DRM-FREE DIGITAL MUSIC
Moved by the troubles with DRM in Europe, Steve Jobs, CEO of Apple Inc. 
published31 on 6th February 2007, an essay called “Thoughts on Music” in 
which he criticized DRM heavily. His main ideas could be summed up as 
26 See:  Russinovich,  M.,  2005,  More  on  Sony:  Dangerous  Decloaking  Patch,  EULAs  and 
Phoning  Home  http://blogs.technet.com/markrussinovich/archive/2005/11/04/more-on-
sony-dangerous-decloaking-patch-eulas-and-phoning-home.aspx  [Accessed  13  January 
2009].
27 See: https://secureweb.rustconsulting.com/sonybmgcdtechsettlement/Instructions.aspx
[Accessed 13 January 2009].
28 Available  at:  http://sonysuit.com/classactions/michaelson/settle.pdf  [Accessed  13  January 
2009].
29 See: http://www.forbrukerombudet.no/index.gan?id=11032467
30 Berka,  J.  2008,  Norwegian  Market  Council  case  against  Apple  progressing,  arstechnica, 
http://arstechnica.com/journals/apple.ars/2008/11/06/norwegian-market-council-case-
against-apple-progressing [Accessed 13 January 2009].
31 Jobs, S. 2007, Thoughts on Music, http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic/ [Ac-
cessed 13 January 2009].
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follows. First, DRM have never been perfect and foolproof, thus discomfort-
ing users, who would behave legally anyway. The DRM oppression only 
encourages people to obtain DRM-free music which comes mainly from il-
legal sources. And lastly he said that the most common way to get music 
was via CD, which is DRM-free and easily convertible into compressed mu-
sic digital formats. This statement was a very lethal blow to DRM in general 
and the four major recording companies (EMI Music, Warner Music, Sony 
BMG and Universal Music Group) encouraged by the daring words of Steve 
Jobs started to offer32 their catalogues online in unprotected MP3 formats 
mainly  via  the  biggest  MP3  retailer,  namely  Amazon.com,  which  was 
launched on September 25th 2007. Finally also iTunes started to offer music 
DRM-free as mentioned above in [3.3].
3.5. THE DIGITAL MUSIC SERVICES FIASCO
The fact that the costs of DRM do not measure up to the results, together 
with the expanding possibilities to acquire DRM free music33 led the main 
providers  of  digital  DRM  protected  music  services34 (MSN  Music,  Wal-
Mart, and Yahoo! Music Store) in early 2008 to the decision to shut down 
their licensing servers. In order to understand the importance of such con-
troversial decision we have to draft out the basic system functioning of such 
digital music services.35 The whole system consists of three components: the 
content server, the DRM license key servers and the user’s client. If the user 
wants to play the media file, he has to give the adequate consideration first 
and download the media file from the content server. Than the DRM pro-
tected media file sends a request to the DRM license key server to authorize 
the computer on which it is going to be played and only after all these steps 
the media file could be rendered. In case that the user would like to play the 
file on any other than authorized device, the whole process has to be run 
again. Usually the number of devices, that could be authorized, is limited 
by the DRM. By the aforementioned decision the providers practically took 
away the users’ possibility to consume their purchased music after a delib-
erately set date. 
32 EMI in April 2007, see http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/02/09/emi_ditching_drm/; Univer-
sal Music Group in August 2007, see http://blog.wired.com/music/2007/08/universal-exper-
.html;  Warner  Music  Group  in  December  2007,  see:  http://www.techcrunch.com/
2007/12/27/amazon-adds-warner-music-to-drm-free-roster/; and Sony BMG in January 2008 
(see: http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080110-amazon-rounds-out-drm-free-music-of-
fering-with-sony-bmg.html) [Accessed 13 January 2009].
33 As mentioned in [3.4].
34 The DRM issues of the biggest digital music retailer, namely Apple with its iTunes is dis-
cussed above.
35 The  most  used  DRM  system  on  digital  music  services  is  the  Windows  Media  DRM 
http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowsmedia/forpros/drm/default.mspx
[Accessed 13 January 2009].
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Concretely, Microsoft, operator of the MSN Music sent out on April 29th 
2008 an email to its customers with the following statement:
“As of August 31, 2008, we will no longer be able to support the retrieval 
of license keys for the songs you purchased from MSN Music or the author-
ization of additional computers. You will need to obtain a license key for 
each of your songs downloaded from MSN Music on any new computer, 
and you must do so before August 31, 2008. If you attempt to transfer your 
songs to additional computers after August 31, 2008, those songs will not 
successfully play.”36
After  heavy  criticism  from  the  leading  Anti-DRM  groups37 Microsoft 
made a complete turnaround and revoked the shutdown of its  licensing 
servers, stating that: “After careful consideration, Microsoft has decided to 
continue to support the authorization of new computers and devices and 
delivery of new license keys for MSN Music customers through at least the 
end of 2011, after which we will evaluate how much this functionality is still 
being used and what steps should be taken next to support our customers. 
This means you will continue to be able to listen to your purchased music 
and transfer your music to new PCs and devices beyond the previously an-
nounced August 31, 2008 date.”38
Another digital music provider Wal-mart followed practically the same 
pattern – first it announced the shutdown of the licensing servers and after 
a while rescinded its decision.
Yahoo! Music took a different approach39 – they let their servers down 
for good and offered users either free credit to repurchase their tracks at Ya-
hoo-owned DRM-free store Rhapsody or full refunds.
This behavior of the DRM-entrepreneurs fulfilled the warning predic-
tions40 of the Anti-DRM advocates and proved how easily the technological 
and decisive power of the DRM-operators could be misused. Worth men-
tioning is also the fact that all of the digital music providers advised41 the 
36 Cheng,  J.  2008,  DRM  sucks  redux:  Microsoft  to  nuke  MSN  Music  DRM  keys,  
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080422-drm-sucks-redux-microsoft-to-nuke-msn-
music-drm-keys.html [Accessed 13 January 2009].
37 E.g. EFF – Open Letter to Steven A. Ballmer, Chief Executive Officer of Microsoft, available 
at: http://www.eff.org/files/MSletter.pdf [Accessed 13 January 2009].
38 Cheng,  J.  2008,  Microsoft  does  180,  will  continue  to  support  MSN  Music  DRM,  
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080618-microsoft-does-180-will-continue-to-sup-
port-msn-music-drm.html [Accessed 13 January 2009].
39 Cheng,  J.  2008,  Yahoo  relents,  gives  coupons,  refunds  to  music  DRM  captives  
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080731-yahoo-relents-gives-coupons-refunds-to-
music-drm-captives.html [Accessed 13 January 2009].
40 See  e.g.:  http://www.eff.org/pages/customer-always-wrong-users-guide-drm-online-music 
[Accessed 13 January 2009].
41 Example being Yahoo! – see:  http://help.yahoo.com/l/us/yahoo/music/rhapsodymigration/
faq.html [Accessed 13 January 2009].
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customers to “backup” their  purchased songs, by burning the purchased 
DRM protected songs to  CD and then  re-ripping  it  back  to  compressed 
format (e.g. MP3), which in fact meant the factual admission of obsolescence 
of DRM. The question that remains is what will happen to the purchased 
DRM protected songs when the prolonged maintenance period of the serv-
ers is over.
4. DRM – DEFECTIVE BY DESIGN?
The aim of this article  is  not to argue that the best solution would be to 
abandon the attempts to control the dissemination of copyrighted digital 
contents or even the whole idea of copyright. Rather, it should be shown, 
that the implementation of robust and restrictive DRM as we know it today 
is not the right way, especially not for the consumers of the digital contents. 
To put it in another words, the content providers have simply gone too far 
in their effort to protect their interest.
Therefore, the only conclusion we can draw from the facts mentioned 
above is that the DRM in their current form were a nice idea, which unfor-
tunately  did  not  work.  The  contemporary  DRM  have  failed  and  have 
proven themselves as defective by design mainly because of the following 
reasons:42
First of all DRM are very ineffective and not foolproof, almost every DRM 
have been hacked43 sooner or later, which illustrates the following table:44
Content/Medium DRM Status Tool
HD DVD AACS Hacked AnyDVD HD 
Blu-ray Disc AACS Hacked BackupBluRay 
iTunes Music FairPlay Hacked JHymn 
PlaysForSure Windows Media DRM Hacked FairUse4WM 1.3 
TiVo .tivo files Hacked TiVoDecode Manager 
DVD movies CSS Hacked AnyDVD 
42 In rough outline we could identify with the views of Steve Jobs presented in [3.4].
43 For a comprehensive overview of the history of hacking DRM, see Anderson,  N. 2006, 
“Hacking Digital Rights Management” http://arstechnica.com/articles/culture/drmhacks.ars 
[Accessed 13 January 2009].
44 Adapted  from:  Ricker,  T.  2006,  ’DRM:  the  state  of  disrepair’,  Engadget,  http://
www.engadget.com/2007/02/16/drm-the-state-of-disrepair/ [Accessed 13 January 2009].
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Furthermore, copyright is basically working as an ex-post protection mech-
anism. That is, according to the “traditional” (i.e. non digital) copyright law, 
the copyright holder has to hold the alleged infringer liable in court, burden 
of proof and then get remedies. The behavior of the user of work (i.e. the 
potential infringer) cannot be controlled once the work was set free on mar-
ket. DRM on the other hand work as an ex-ante determinant of behavior 
and often fail to comply with the exceptions which vary widely from juris-
diction to jurisdiction. DRM thus tend to override the statutory copyright 
and are  creating  a  sort  of  paracopyright  with  the  tendency  to  favor  the 
copyright holders – this process could be also called as the technologisation 
of copyright. 
Next, DRM are simply a nuisance, as demonstrated on the illustrative 
cases before, preventing the users to enjoy the main benefits of digitaliza-
tion, that is the possibility of users to enjoy the copyrighted work, whenev-
er, wherever and in whichever format they want (also called time-shifting, 
space-shifting and format-shifting). The entertainment industry simply does 
not bear in mind the simple fact that, in the long run what matters are the 
paying  customers.  To  illustrate  the  complete  disregard  to  users  we  can 
quote Thomas Hesse, Sony BMG’s president of global digital business, who 
said in an interview about the Sony Rootkit Scandal the following: “Most 
people don't even know what a rootkit is, so why should they care about 
it?”45
Finally, every DRM are subject to the phenomena called “analog hole”. 
Simply put, the human senses are analog; in order to perceive the digital 
content  it  has  to  be converted into analog.46 However any analog signal 
could be converted back into digital form and copied, though with some 
loss in quality. As the copying technology will progress it could be also ar-
gued, that a foolproof DRM are logically not possible.
5. THE FUTURE OF DRM
Unfortunately, to provide a simple and viable answer to the question how 
the future of DRM will look like is nearly impossible and there is also no 
“one-size-fits-all” solution. The “arms race” between copyright industries 
and proactive users who want to benefit fully from their statutory excep-
tions resembles the fate of the Red Queen in Lewis Carroll’s book Through 
the Looking-Glass,  where she describes her situation as follows:  “in this 
45 Ulaby,  N.  2005,  Sony  Music  CDs  Under  Fire  from  Privacy  Advocates  http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4989260 [Accessed 15 May January 2009].
46 EFF, Analog hole, http://www.eff.org/issues/analog-hole [Accessed 13 January 2009].
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place it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.”47 Both 
groups are developing better technological solutions either to protect the di-
gital content or to crack this protection, but in the end they are both stand-
ing in the same place, that is without any viable answer to the digital di-
lemma.48
As seen on the example of digital music, even the copyright industries 
have already realized the flaws of contemporary DRM and decided to at-
tempt to profit from abundance instead of scarcity.49 Therefore it remains 
questionable, whether some sort of DRM should be used in future. If any 
DRM should be employed at all, it should be multiplatform, user-friendly, 
based  on  non-limiting,  non-invasive,  non-protecting  simple  use-tracking 
watermarking or fingerprinting mechanisms.
Another interesting challenge for DRM and copyright in general should 
be according to Bechtold50 development of connectivity. Provided that all 
the content could be streamed instantly and the amount of trafficked data 
would be irrelevant, the traditional copyright terms like copying would be-
come obsolete – deciding factor would not be the presence of the content on 
the user’s side but merely the link to the central content server.
Concerning the future legal regulation the emphasis must be laid on an 
attempt to update the current legislation in such way, that it would focus on 
uncompromising enforcement of consumers’ digital rights. Furthermore the 
tendency should be not to overregulate the whole area of DRM. The rather 
lengthy national law-making process could pose a threat to the innovation 
and development of new types of DRM.
The  road  to  a  perfect  DRM solution  that  would  satisfy  everyone  in-
volved is still fuzzy and definitely unclear, what we have seen so far were 
more or less trial and error attempts. When answering the questions what 
the best DRM solution is,  we can quote and join professor  Wiebe,51 who 
gave perhaps the most pertinent answer: “We shall see, let the market decide”.
47 Carroll,  L.  2008,  'Through  the  Looking-Glass',  http://www.gutenberg.org/files/12/12-h/
12-h.htm [Accessed 13 January 2009]. 
48 The dichotomy between the basic right of copyright holder to control the use of content and 
the immanent feature of digitalized content to be copied flawlessly and at no cost. Further 
see: National Research Council, Committee on Intellectual Property Rights and the Emer-
ging Information Infrastructure, 2000, 'The Digital Dilemma: Intellectual Property in the In-
formation Age', http://www.nap.edu/html/digital_dilemma/exec_summ.html
[Accessed 13 January 2009].
49 Rosenblatt, B. 2008, 2008 Year in Review, Part 1, drmwatch.org, http://www.drmwatch.com/
drmtech/article.php/3793156 [Accessed 13 January 2009)
50 Bechtold, S. 2003, 'The Present and Future of Digital Rights Management' In: Becker Eber-
hard, Buhse Willms, Günnewig Dirk, Rump Niels. (Eds.) Digital Rights Management: Tech-
nological, Economic and Political Aspects. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2003, p. 600.
51 Who answered exactly the same question in the Intellectual property session of the 6th Inter-
national Conference Cyberspace held in Brno on 29Th November 2008. 
